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Mathematical Models of Abstract Systems:
Knowing abstract geometric forms
Jean-Pierre Marquis(1)
ABSTRACT. — Scientists use models to know the world. It is usually
assumed that mathematicians doing pure mathematics do not. Mathe-
maticians doing pure mathematics prove theorems about mathematical
entities like sets, numbers, geometric ﬁgures, spaces, etc., they compute
various functions and solve equations. In this paper, I want to exhibit
models build by mathematicians to study the fundamental components
of spaces and, more generally, of mathematical forms. I focus on one area
of mathematics where models occupy a central role, namely homotopy
theory. I argue that mathematicians introduce genuine models and I oﬀer
a rough classiﬁcation of these models.
RE´SUME´. — Les scientiﬁques construisent des mode`les pour connaˆıtre
le monde. On suppose, en ge´ne´ral, que les mathe´maticiens qui font des
mathe´matiques pures n’ont pas recours a` de tels mode`les. En mathe´mati-
ques pures, on prouve des the´ore`mes au sujet d’entite´s mathe´matiques
comme les ensembles, les nombres, les ﬁgures ge´ome´triques, etc., on calcule
des fonctions et on re´sout des e´quations. Dans cet article, je pre´sente cer-
tains mode`les construits par des mathe´maticiens qui permettent d’e´tudier
les composantes fondamentales des espaces et, plus ge´ne´ralement, des
formes mathe´matiques. Cet article explore principalement la the´orie de
l’homotopie, secteur des mathe´matiques ou` les mode`les occupent une
place centrale. Je soutiens que les mathe´maticiens introduisent des mode`les
au sens courant du terme et je pre´sente une premie`re classiﬁcation de ces
mode`les.
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1. Knowledge of pure mathematics
The goal of what is customarily called “pure mathematics” seems to be
clear and straightforward: to acquire knowledge about mathematical objects
by developing theories about them. These theories contain deﬁnitions of the
objects with some of their properties and mathematicians prove theorems
about them. In some cases, pure mathematicians have to compute certain
formulas to obtain the information about a speciﬁc situation, e.g. a certain
cohomology group. From a philosophical point of view, this picture is handy
and precious: the justiﬁcation of mathematical knowledge follows a founda-
tionalist pattern thoroughly familiar to philosophers. This is certainly ﬁne
to a large extent. But is that all? Some mathematicians have opened the
door to other facets of the practice. To wit:
What do we view as our chief goal when we ‘do’ mathematics?
It is customary, at least among pure mathematicians, to say
that we seek to prove theorems. Theorems and nothing else are
the currency of the ﬁeld: they buy you a thesis, invitations to
deliver colloquia and especially a job. [...]
Opposed to this, however, is the idea of a model. Models are
most prominent in applied mathematics where they express the
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essential point at which chaos of experiment gets converted into
a well-deﬁned mathematical problem. But pure mathematics is
full of models too: one area, let’s say, has uncovered a complex
set of examples and is stuck making a direct attack on them.
Often the best approach is to isolate part of the structure, in
eﬀect deﬁning a model which is easier to attack. ([68])
In this passage, the mathematician David Mumford uses the term ‘model’
in a way that is not unlike the way scientists and philosophers of science use
it1. The idea as presented by Mumford is straightforward: one ‘abstracts’ or
‘isolates’ data from a complex situation. If this abstraction is done properly,
then one obtains a model of the original complex and messy examples. By
studying the model and its properties, one can explain various phenomena,
predict certain eﬀects and, which is probably more relevant here, understand
crucial aspects of the situation2. As Mumford says himself, this is not usually
thought as being a part of the practice of the pure mathematician. But it is
— Mumford does not have one doubt about it — and, in fact, it is nowadays
crucial and does reﬂect important epistemological aspects of contemporary
mathematics.
At ﬁrst sight, the idea that pure mathematicians need to build models
in a way that is analogous to scientists seems to be preposterous. Indeed,
models usually stand between empirical data and theories. They are either
built from the data themselves, the so-called phenomenological models, or
they are built from the theoretical principles, the so-called theoretical mod-
els. They constitute a bridge between a collection of speciﬁc, singular data
and universal, general laws, usually presented in the language of mathemat-
ics. They are used to represent certain aspects of a situation, devised so
that mathematical methods can be applied to the situation and thus, cer-
tain inferences can be performed rigorously. Models turn complex, singular
situations into tractable, comprehensible, understandable, explainable and,
in the best cases, predictable situations.
What on earth would pure mathematicians model in the ﬁrst place? As
pure mathematicians, they do not model empirical situations or systems.
So what is it that they model? The only possible answer is that they want
to model mathematical objects. If one accepts that the latter makes sense,
then one comes upon the second bizarrerie: Why would pure mathematicians
have to model mathematical objects? What is it about these objects that
require mathematicians to model them? Why would anyone model math-
(1) And not the way logicians use it, I should hastily add. Some standard references
on the use of models in the factual sciences are [67, 84].
(2) Whether this constitutes an adequate description of the nature and use of models
in the factual sciences is an issue all to itself and is certainly not directly relevant here.
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ematical objects by other mathematical objects? And why with models?
Why are the latter called ‘models’ in the ﬁrst place? Are models introduced
for reasons similar to those introduced for real physical systems? Does it
make sense to model a type of mathematical objects in order to apply math-
ematical methods to them? Well, it does. Fortunately for us, Mumford gives
an example in the foregoing quote:
This is how algebraic topology got going in the 50’s: the cat-
egory of homotopy types of spaces was deﬁned and the ﬁeld
exploded once this ‘model’ for topological spaces was made
explicit. This type of model is based on throwing away part
of the structure so as to concentrate on speciﬁc aspects which
work as self-consistent non-trivial structure in their own right.
([68])
We now have speciﬁc data to work with: the objects modeled are topologi-
cal spaces. In the philosophical literature, topological spaces would be called
the “target system”([38]). The model is given by the category of homotopy
types of spaces and these could be called the “model system”. We are also
told that the ﬁeld of algebraic topology exploded once a model was intro-
duced and used. The model apparently opens up avenues and provides a
rich harvest of results. Furthermore, it is a model since, according to Mum-
ford, one abstracts from topological spaces and thus obtains a new type of
mathematical object that can be studied in its own right and yield relevant
information about the original objects.
Why do mathematicians need models of topological spaces? What is it
about them that requires that mathematicians ﬁnd models? And what kind
of mathematical objects will these models be? There is, after all, a whole
general theory of topological spaces, as anyone can learn from [13, 14, 55, 69].
For applications, one can then turn to speciﬁc classes of topological spaces,
e.g. metric spaces, Lp-spaces, etc. I will, in the next section, propose a partial
answer to these questions.
Is Mumford’s use of the term ‘model’ legitimate? Or is it only an analogy
with the case of models in the factual sciences? Even if it is only an analogy,
why does Mumford believe that it is an appropriate analogy? I will try to
argue that it is a legitimate usage of the term. I will also try to show that
there are in fact diﬀerent senses of the term involved. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the various uses of models in algebraic topology. I will also
try to make some preliminary steps into the epistemological consequences
of this dimension of contemporary mathematical practice. I hasten to add
that I present this paper as a ﬁrst step only, that my goal is merely to open
the door and set up the table for further studies. Let us now brieﬂy turn to
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the mathematical background required to understand the technical details
involved in the proposed claims.
2. Space and its models
The concept of space evolved radically during the 19th century. What
was one concept, Euclidian space, with a ﬁxed, clear reference, namely the
real physical space, became a plethora of diﬀerent concepts with no clear
physical referent. At the most general level, the culminating point of this
development was the concept of topological space, as introduced by Haus-
dorﬀ in 1914. The accompanying notion, that of continuity, was ﬁnally made
clear and rigorous by Hausdorﬀ’s deﬁnition. But the methods used to study
topological spaces were split in two: there were the combinatorial methods
of the so-called analysis situs and there were the methods based on the new
set theory introduced by Cantor and applied by Hausdorﬀ himself in his
book. Once the notion was accepted, clariﬁed, simpliﬁed and extensively
used and once the notion of homeomorphism3, that is the criterion of iden-
tity for topological spaces, was given clearly by Kuratowski, the problem of
classifying topological spaces emerged naturally.
Here is how Seifert and Threlfall presented what they called the prin-
cipal problem of topology in the introduction of their textbook originally
published in German in 1934:
The principal problem of topology is to decide whether two
given ﬁgures are homeomorphic and, when possible, to enumer-
ate all classes of nonhomeomorphic ﬁgures. Although extensive
theories exist which treat arbitrary subsets of Euclidean space,
we will not deal with the concept of a ﬁgure in that generality.
To do so would entangle us in set theoretic diﬃculties. The
concept of a complex, as introduced by L.E.J. Brouwer, and
further narrowed down during the course of our investigations
to that of a manifold, will be suﬃciently restrictive so that it
bypasses the set theoretic diﬃculties but will also be broad
enough to include almost all ﬁgures of interest. The topology
which we treat here is not, then, set theoretic topology but is
a topology of complexes and manifolds. ([79, p. 4])
The goal for the pure mathematician in this case is straightforward:
enumerate all classes of non homeomorphic ﬁgures. This is a typical clas-
siﬁcation problem. That is easy to say but another matter to complete it.
(3) Let X and Y be topological spaces. A homeomorphism between X and Y is a
continuous map f : X → Y such that f ◦ f−1 = idY and f−1 ◦ f = idX , where f−1 is
the inverse map f−1 : Y → X and is continuous.
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To show that two spaces are homeomorphic, one has to construct a homeo-
morphism between them. It is not because such a homeomorphism has not
been found that there cannot be one. At some point, doubts sink in and one
tries to show that two given spaces cannot be homeomorphic. In this case,
one has to show there there is no possible way to deﬁne a homeomorphism
between two given ﬁgures. How does one do that? A diﬀerent mathematical
strategy is required. Much of the machinery of algebraic topology was con-
ceived with precisely this goal in mind: to ﬁnd ways to establish classes of
non homeomorphic spaces. One possible strategy consists in ﬁnding ways to
solve the problem to classes of spaces and then try to extend these methods
to the other classes. This is where models of certain spaces might turn out
to be useful. If they can simplify the context, provide various handles for
computations and clearly capture the relevant properties for the classiﬁca-
tion problem, then it is certainly a good idea to develop and study these
models.
Other obstructions to the classiﬁcation problem emerged along the way,
obstructions that seem to be circumstantials. The ﬁrst one mentioned in
the foregoing quote is that arbitrary subsets of Euclidean space include
numerous pathological spaces that arise simply because set theoretical tools
are employed to deﬁne them. This situation is echoed by another important
mathematician of the 1930s:
Nowadays we tend, almost automatically, to identify physical
space with the space of three variables and to interpret physical
continuity in the classical function theoretical manner. But the
space of three real variables is not the only possible model of
physical space, nor is it a satisfactory model for dealing with
certain types of problems. Whenever we attack a topological
problem by analytic methods it almost invariably happens that
to the intrinsic diﬃculties of the problem, which we can hardly
hope to avoid, there are added certain extraneous diﬃculties
in no way connected with the problem itself, but apparently
associated with the particular type of machinery in dealing
with it4. (Alexander, quoted in [45, p. 564].)
The ‘particular type of machinery’ that Alexander has in mind here is
the set-theoretical machinery. We can immediately draw an epistemologi-
cal moral: there are numerous models of (physical) space and they rest on
various mathematical frameworks. A model, in the natural sciences and in
(4) Notice that the usual deﬁnition of a topological space as a set of points satisfying
the usual axioms of a topology is seen here as a model of physical space. But this deﬁnition
is, in a sense, too broad for it allows for models of spaces that are “pathological” from
the geometric point of view.
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applied mathematics, is devised with a speciﬁc function in mind, with a
purpose, a problem to be solved. In that respect, some models are better
than others and a target system might have diﬀerent, incompatible model
systems. Is this the case in pure mathematics too? As the foregoing quotes
suggest, there was a sentiment that set-theoretical tools were inadequate to
model various aspects of geometric spaces. This was already clear to some
mathematicians as early as the beginning of the 1930s. One way around
these unwanted diﬃculties is to develop alternative approaches and, in this
speciﬁc case, it rested on the notion of a complex.
The property which distinguishes a complex from an arbitrary
point set of a space is its triangulability: a complex is a point
set consisting of ﬁnitely many or countably inﬁnitely many
not-necessarily straight-line intervals, triangles, tetrahedra, or
corresponding higher dimensional building stones, assembled
together as a structure. (...) As a consequence of the trian-
gulability property, most so-called pathological point sets will
be excluded from our considerations. A close connection with
objects of geometric interest is then achieved, ... . Examples
of complexes are: all Riemann surfaces; Euclidean space of ar-
bitrary dimension; open subsets and algebraic curves and sur-
faces lying within that space; the projective plane and pro-
jective 3-space; all Euclidean and non-Euclidean space forms,
regions of discontinuity of metric groups of motions and, ﬁ-
nally, position and phase spaces of mechanical systems. [79,
p. 5]
Complexes were deﬁned to model geometric spaces of interest from a
combinatorial point of view. They are of interest because they can be used
to compute various properties of the spaces they model. Between roughly
1910 and the 1940s, various types of complexes were introduced for diﬀerent
purposes. We will here focus on complexes that play an important role in
the study of homotopy types. But before we do so, we have to make a pause
to discuss some of the basic philosophical facets of models in the sciences.
3. Models in pure mathematics
As far as I know, there is no commonly accepted typology of models in
philosophy of science5. There are obvious examples of types of models in sci-
ence and technology: scale models, idealized models, analogical models, phe-
(5) In the article on models in science of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, one
ﬁnds an interesting discussion of various kinds of models and issues related to them, but
there is no general classiﬁcation of models. For a daring and unorthodox attempt at such
a typology, see [77].
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nomenological models, mathematical models, theoretical models, bayesian
models to mention but the most obvious. One also ﬁnds animal models or,
more generally, in vivo models and in vitro models in the biological sciences.
This list is not exhaustive nor is it exclusive. It is easy to give examples of
each of these types, e.g. Bohr’s model of the atom. Particular models can be
physical objects, equations, descriptions, some sort of idealized or ﬁctitious
systems, not to say that it can be a combination of some of these elements.
Some philosophers have argued that the best we can do is to provide a
functional characterization of scientiﬁc models. In other words, what scien-
tiﬁc models would have in common is their function and the latter would
roughly be to represent some system in the real world6. Other philosophers
have lately attempted an ontological characterization, trying to capture the
common nature of scientiﬁc models. For instance, Gabriele Contessa has
recently oﬀered a provisional taxonomy of scientiﬁc models based on on-
tological properties7. According to him, there are three types of models:
material models, mathematical models and ﬁctional models. Material mod-
els include, at the very least, scale models, physical models and biological
models. For instance, that particular well-known construction made up of
wooden or plastic balls and rods in many biology classes standing for the
DNA helix is a material model and so is the scale model of a car built up
by engineers to test air resistance. Mathematical models usually boil down
to a diﬀerential equation or a system of diﬀerential equations, as in the
Lokta-Volterra model in population biology. They constitute the bread and
butter of dynamical systems theory. Contessa leaves their ontological status
to philosophers of mathematics. I will get back to this issue in the next
paragraph. Finally, we have ﬁctional models. These include the proverbial
ideal pendulum in classical mechanics, various models of the atom or its
nucleus and a myriad of other well-known cases. What intrigues philoso-
phers about these models is that they are not concrete objects nor are they
purely abstract objects since they stand for concrete systems in a crucial
manner. According to Contessa, these ﬁctional models belong to the onto-
logical genus of imaginary objects.
As the foregoing quote by Mumford already indicates, the functional
aspect inherent to scientiﬁc models is also a key part in the usage of the
terminology in the mathematical case. However, I claim that there is an
ontological component in this too. Although it might seem that our forth-
coming examples of models in mathematics cannot fall under the ontological
classiﬁcation oﬀered so far, I venture to make some preliminary and rough
remarks in this respect.
(6) See, for instance, [39].
(7) See [28]. See also [38, 87].
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Of course, the models we are talking about are not material models8.
They are trivially mathematical models, since they are mathematical ob-
jects themselves. What is peculiar in our case is that the target system is
itself a mathematical system. One could claim that our models are also ﬁc-
tional objects on the grounds that all mathematical objects are ﬁctional
objects9. But I believe that this claim would completely miss the point,
in particular the ontological point of the story. The ontological component
has to do, in a nutshell, with the fact that we are dealing, in a sense to be
clariﬁed fully elsewhere, with conceptual artifacts10. Mathematical models
are not merely mathematical objects that satisfy certain properties. They
are objects that are given in a way that they have such and such properties
that are wanted for a certain purpose. The latter are guaranteed by the
artifactual nature of the objects. They are, in a very loose sense, designed
and constructed with these properties in mind. It is a clear case where form
and function go together, where form is designed with a speciﬁc function
in mind11. In other words, we are dealing with a case of conceptual design,
that is designing conceptual objects12. In our cases, either the models are
constructed systematically according to an explicit plan or they are carved
out of a given system of objects by certain choices that then determine the
whole structure of the models. Needless to say, the objects are not literally
constructed, that is physically or materially, and the models are not liter-
ally carved out by a series of choices. We are talking about conceptual or
abstract artifacts after all.
Thus, from the ontological point of view, we are trying to identify within
mathematical objects, a category of objects that were designed by math-
ematicians with a speciﬁc purpose in mind, namely to stand in for other
mathematical objects. It is important to note that there can be and, in
fact, there often is, a whole theory of these objects. We are not dwelling
here with the other categories of mathematical objects, but we are submit-
(8) But, as is well known, there are material models of geometrical objects, for in-
stance polytopes and they do serve as models. Some of the cases we are interested in are
related to these. Obviously, the material models of geometrical objects are not used by
mathematicians in the way that a scale model can be used by engineers. They can be
prosthetic to visual thinking or to thinking in general.
(9) This latter claim goes back at least to Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of the as if.
(See [88].) It is gaining in popularity in philosophy of mathematics. See, for instance,
[25, 59]. I am not, however, endorsing a form of ﬁctionalism here. See [85, 86, 65] for
some arguments against this view.
(10) Artifacts are often presented as having a dual nature: as material objects and
embodying intentional functions. See the whole issue of [57] and [56]. I would argue that
mathematical objects also have a crucial material facet in the form of notational systems
and devices.
(11) Just to be entirely clear: I am not using the term “function” in its mathematical
sense in this context.
(12) Since I am talking about design, this would be a natural place to introduce beauty
in the picture.
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ting the idea that there are mathematical objects that should be thought of
as being conceptual artifacts. This ontological category is of course coupled
with an epistemological function and both the ontological and the epistemo-
logical facets have to be taken together for our claim to be comprehensible
and plausible. The upshot is that I claim that we are introducing a legitimate
notion of model since: 1. models in the factual sciences and in pure math-
ematics share basically the same epistemological function and 2. models in
the factual sciences and in pure mathematics are fundamentally artifacts.
This being said, we can be more speciﬁc about the types of models
that one can ﬁnd in pure mathematics. We will encounter three diﬀerent
types of mathematical models. I hasten to add that there are probably
more. The ﬁrst two are akin to a scale model, but that comparison might
be more misleading than anything else! The underlying idea of the ﬁrst
type is to replace a mathematical object, for instance a topological space,
by another topological space which is constructed in a certain way such
that the constructed space has all the same topological properties as the
original space and, furthermore, it has nice computational properties, this
latter term understood in a loose sense. Furthermore, the construction can
be performed systematically if not for all topological spaces, at least for
topological spaces that are deemed of interest, usually qualiﬁed as being
“nice” topological spaces. Since the model building revolves around a recipe
for constructing objects, we will call these models, object models.
We say that X is a object model of Y if:
1. X is constructed systematically according to an explicit plan or rule;
2. X stands for Y , that is, X possesses all the relevant properties of Y ;
3. X can be manipulated systematically, that is one can compute with
X or one can compare features of X with other entities of the same
kind;
4. X allows one to explain, understand and even predict certain aspects
of Y .
This characterization is very general, but it can not be applied to con-
crete models and other models in the factual sciences. Of course, in the
case of mathematics, the objects X and Y are mathematical objects and,
in this case and as we have already indicated, it is perhaps the nature of
the Y ’s that is more curious. But although this already constitute a crucial
diﬀerence between our models and concrete models, the key diﬀerence lies
in the fact that object models possess all the relevant properties of the tar-
get system. This is of course impossible in the case of models of concrete
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systems and is attributable to the fact that all our objects are mathematical
objects.
The second notion is a variation on the ﬁrst, but it introduces a level
of abstraction in the picture. In this case, the model is not of the same
kind as the target object and it is not (necessarily) constructed from an
explicit rule. However it is a model of the target system since it is possible
to construct an object like the target object from the model and the latter
possesses or captures the essential properties of the target object.
We say that X is a codiﬁed model of Y if:
1. X contains all the information to construct an object equivalent to
Y ;
2. X itself codiﬁes fundamental properties of Y ;
3. X can be manipulated systematically, that is one can compute with
X or one can compare features of X with other entities of the same
kind;
4. X allows one to explain, understand and even predict certain aspects
of Y .
The third notion is more general, more abstract and is what Mumford
has in mind. In this case, the target system is a given category – in the
mathematical sense of the term – and one constructs a new category and a
functor between the categories. Of course, it is a very speciﬁc construction
with very speciﬁc properties. The constructed category is the model in this
case13.
We say that T̂ is a systemic model of T if:
1. T̂ and T are categories;
2. The category T is what is called a homotopical category, that is it has
a distinguished set W of maps, called the weak equivalences which
contains all the identities of T, and thus all the objects of the latter,
and it satisﬁes the two out of six property14;
3. The category T̂ is the homotopy category of T; it is constructed by
formally inverting the weak equivalences of T and there is a canonical
quotient functor I : T → T̂;
(13) What is usually called ‘pure category theory’ might be seen in this light in gen-
eral, that is as providing abstract models of various ﬁelds of mathematics, e.g. abelian
categories, cartesian categories, cartesian closed categories, etc. We will not enter this
discussion in this paper.
(14) This condition says that, given any three morphisms f , g and h in T for which two
composition gf and hg exist and are in W , the four morphisms f , g, h and hgf are also
in W . See [31, p. 23]. – 979 –
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4. T̂ allows one to explain, understand and even predict certain aspects
of T.
The terminology will become clear as we process in the discussion. We
are aware that the last deﬁnition is at the same time highly technical and,
here, imprecise. We won’t give the precise technical deﬁnition in this paper.
What is important to note for our purpose is that the homotopy category T̂
has the same objects as T. The morphisms are diﬀerent, for the morphisms
in T̂ are equivalence classes of morphisms of T. What this means, funda-
mentally, is that we are looking at the same objects but with a diﬀerent and
more abstract, criterion of identity. It is also important to emphasize im-
mediately that this purely formal deﬁnition encompasses a very large class
of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent examples.
What is fascinating in the case of topological spaces is that these three
types of models interact constantly in contemporary algebraic topology and
their interaction played a key role in the development of what is now called
“modern classical homotopy theory”.
4. Algebraic topology and homotopy types
As its name indicates, algebraic topology is the study of topological
spaces with the means of algebraic methods. For this to be possible, two es-
sential steps have to be carried out. First, for the purpose of computability,
spaces have to be such that they can be manipulated easily by combinato-
rial means, that is, spaces themselves have to be thought of as being made
up, not of points as in point-set topology, but of parts, or in the jargon
of the ﬁeld, of cells and these cells are ﬁtted together according to certain
rules to form the spaces. Thus, at its very roots, algebraic topology oﬀers
various ways of building spaces out of cells and these are already models
of spaces. Second, these models have to be manipulated to construct alge-
braically tractable systems of data. More speciﬁcally, one wants to associate
to a space X a series of invariants that would characterize the space X in
the following sense: if X and Y are diﬀerent spaces, then they should have
at least one diﬀerent (algebraic) invariant. Ideally, one should also be able
to show that if two spaces X and Y have the same invariants, then they
should be identical as spaces. This is of course very vague and it took quite
some time for mathematicians to settle for a proper deﬁnition of topolog-
ical spaces, a proper criterion of identity for topological spaces, a proper
understanding of the invariants involved, that is from numerical invariants
to algebraic invariants, the realization that there was an autonomous ab-
stract geometric form underlying all these invariants, the development of a
theory to study these geometric forms, their invariants, etc. I will not follow
– 980 –
Knowing abstract geometric forms
the historical steps here. Although the historical process is worth looking
at from a philosophical point of view, for our purposes here it would sim-
ply be too long and intricate. (See [29] for an overview of the history of
algebraic topology and [45] for a short description of the main actors and
developments.) Let us now consider some basic deﬁnitions to ﬁx ideas and
the notation.
Let X and Y be topological spaces, I the usual unit interval [0, 1] with
the standard topology, and let f, g : X → Y be two continuous maps.
Definition 4.1. — A homotopy α from f to g, denoted by α : f ⇒ g,
is a continuous map α : X × I → Y such that for all x ∈ X,
α(x, 0) = f(x),
α(x, 1) = g(x).
In words, a homotopy is a continuous deformation of the image of f into
the image of g. In the vernacular language, one could say that a homotopy
is a morphing of f into g. When there is a homotopy between f and g, we
say that they are homotopic. It can be shown that ‘being homotopic’ is an
equivalence relation between continuous maps X → Y .
Although the notion of homotopy was introduced informally by Poincare´
and deﬁned rigorously by Brouwer in 1912, the notion of homotopy equiv-
alence and homotopy type of spaces was introduced by Hurewicz only in
1935. (See [15] and [1].) It took another ﬁfteen years for mathematicians
to understand that homotopy types were at the core of algebraic topology
and another ﬁfteen to twenty years to see that they underly all geometric
structures. (See [5], [7] for more details.)
Let us introduce the deﬁnition of homotopy equivalence of spaces.
Definition 4.2. — Two spaces X and Y are said to be homotopy equiv-
alent if there are continuous maps f : X → Y and g : Y → X and homo-
topies α : f ◦ g ⇒ idY and β : g ◦ f ⇒ idX , that is the composites f ◦ g
and g ◦ f are homotopic to the identities idY and idX respectively. When
two spaces X and Y are homotopy equivalent, we say that they are of the
same homotopy type or that they are tokens of the same homotopy type.
Here are a few standard examples. Let 1 denote the one-point space.
Then it is easy to show that 1 and the real line R are homotopy equivalent!
(The proof follows from the fact that all continuous maps R → R are ho-
motopic.) A space homotopy equivalent to 1 is said to be contractible. For
instance, any open interval (a, b) is contractible and so is any closed interval
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[a, b]. A space with a single point and the real line R are tokens of the same
homotopy type. And so is the real plane R2 and even the n-dimensional
space Rn.
It can be shown that ‘being homotopy equivalent’ is an equivalence re-
lation between spaces. It is tempting at this stage to quotient the class of
all topological spaces under this equivalence relation and declare that an
equivalence class is a homotopy type. But I claim that this would be a seri-
ous mistake. For mathematical purposes, this is not the equivalence relation
that matters. The crucial equivalence relation is the relation between maps
of spaces, that is being homotopic. We will come back to this point in a
short while.
From a philosophical point of view, homotopy types constitute a chal-
lenge. Here are some of the most obvious questions they raise: what are
homotopy types? Should it be considered to be an object in its own right?
If not, what is it? How is a homotopy type given? What is it to know
a homotopy type? One of the main points of this paper is precisely that
homotopy types are known via models. But this claim has to be clariﬁed.
For instance, it is tempting to interpret Mumford as claiming that a
homotopy type is a model of a topological space. I believe that it can be
said that homotopy types are abstracted from topological spaces. However,
I do not want to say that a homotopy type is a model of a topological space.
For homotopy types capture fundamental properties of topological spaces.
They constitute their underlying forms. Furthermore, in the foregoing quote,
Mumford talks about the category of homotopy types as being models of
spaces. We will get back to the category of homotopy types in section 6. To
get a better grasp of what this is suppose to mean, let us recall the notion of
homeomorphic spaces or what is sometimes called ‘topological type’. This
will allow us to contrast and compare the two notions and see how homotopy
types are abstract geometric forms of topological spaces.
A homeomorphism is an isomorphism in the category Top of topological
spaces. As it is easy to see, a homeomorphism is necessarily a bijection. We
say that two spaces X and Y are homeomorphic, written X Top Y , if there
is a homeomorphism between them. Notice that “being homeomorphic” is
an equivalence relation between topological spaces. This is where homotopy
types come in as models of topological spaces. The classiﬁcation of homotopy
types is coarser than the one provided by homeomorphic types.
Notice that whereas a homeomorphism is an identity between composite
maps and identity maps, a homotopy equivalence is a continuous transfor-
mation between composite maps and identity maps. Furthermore, the ho-
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motopies involved in the homotopy equivalence need not be bijections. Note
also that there can be more than one homotopy replacing the identities of
homeomorphisms. In this sense, the identity between two spaces is not, from
the homotopical point of view, an all or nothing aﬀair.
Homotopy theory was more or less launched in the 1930’s by Heinz Hopf
and Witold Hurewicz (and closely followed by many mathematicians, one of
which was J.H.C. Whitehead, A.N. Whitehead’s nephew). The dream here
is to have what is called a complete set of invariants, that is two spaces
would be homotopically equivalent if and only if they had the same set
of invariants. As I write, such sets have been found for speciﬁc cases, but
the general problem seems to be intractable. (See [8] for the case of simply-
connected 4-manifolds, for instance, and [9] for recent progress.) The theory
uses various tools, e.g. homotopy groups, homology and cohomology groups,
ﬁbrations, loop spaces, suspensions, spectral sequences, Postnikov towers,
etc., in order to establish the existence of homotopies between various maps
or to prove that two spaces are not homotopy equivalent.
I will not look explicitly at the speciﬁc tools and machines of homotopy
theory in this paper, e.g. homotopy groups, etc. I want to concentrate on one
aspect of homotopy theory: models of topological spaces and their relations
to homotopy types. In the 1940s, mathematicians realized that they could
construct models of topological spaces that were tailored for the needs of
homotopy theory15. In the process, a particularly adequate notion of cell was
also introduced, namely CW-cells and their associated CW-complexes. As
we will see, there is, already at this stage, a very close connection between
the algebraic data, the homotopy types and their geometric realization, i.e.
the spaces.
5. Cells and CW-complexes
Any child knows that various surfaces and volumes can be constructed
from simple pieces by following a plan. In fact, all our buildings are con-
structed this way: from simple pieces and ‘gluing’ rules, we assemble elab-
orate spaces. Furthermore, children also learn how to determine certain
properties of a space, e.g. a line segment, a surface or a solid, by combining
properties of its parts, when, for instance, they have to compute the vol-
ume of a solid. These simple facts ought to be applicable to abstract spaces
too and, not surprisingly, they are. One has to start with simple blocks of
diﬀerent dimensions, called ‘cells’ or ‘n-cells’ in this case and combinatorial
rules to put these cells to form a space. Combinatorial topology, as it was
(15) These were introduced by J.H.C. Whitehead and R. H. Fox. See [93], [94], [36],
[35].
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used to be called before it became algebraic topology, starts from this prin-
ciple: a space can be constructed from simple, knowable pieces according
to simple and clear construction rules. The ﬁrst such constructions were
simplicial complexes. A more general and ﬂexible notion was introduced
by J.H.C. Whitehead for the purpose of homotopy theory in 1949. Very
roughly speaking, the construction set is made up, in this case, of spheres
of various dimensions that can be glued together in complicated ways at
various points. Before we can give the formal deﬁnitions, we need to recall
some basic conventions.
The n-dimensional disk, or n-disk Dn is the subspace of Rn deﬁned by
Dn = {x ∈ Rn : |x|  1},
with the induced topology and where the function | · | : Rn → [0,∞[ is the
standard norm on Rn. The open n-disk, Dn, is, of course, the interior of
Dn, hence
Dn = {x ∈ Rn : |x| < 1}
and the boundary of Dn in Rn is the standard (n− 1)-sphere
Sn−1 = {x ∈ Rn : |x| = 1}.
We can now deﬁne the cells.
Definition 5.1. — An n-cell is a space homeomorphic to the open n-
disk Dn. A cell is a space which is an n-cell for some n  0.
Let us unpack this somewhat. Since D0 is the same as R0, which is the
same as {0} by deﬁnition, and D0 = D0, a 0-cell is simply a point. A 1-cell
is clearly essentially a line segment. A 2-cell is a disk and a 3-cell is a sphere.
Although we won’t give any argument for this, it is fairly easy to convince
oneself that a n-cell is of dimension n.
Roughly speaking, a CW-complex is a way to glue cells together —
possibly inﬁnitely many of them — according to certain reasonable patterns.
For a space X to be a CW-complex, it has to be constructed by the following
procedure. One starts with a collection X0 of 0-cells, that is a collection
of points. We then proceed by induction by attaching n-cells to already
constructed (n− 1)-cells and we glue them appropriately. For instance, we
can construct a sphere S2 by taking one 0-cell, a point, and one 2-cell, an
open disk and by gluing the boundary of the open disk to the point. This
is more or less a balloon. Compare this construction with a basketball or
a soccer ball: in each of these, there are more cells, namely the diﬀerent
patches glued together to form the ball. Each one of these correspond to
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diﬀerent ways of constructing a sphere. It is easy to see that any n-sphere
can be constructed by taking a 0-cell and an n-cell and gluing the boundary
of the n-cell to the point. Thus, any n-sphere can be decomposed into two
cells, a very simple decomposition. The operations of gluing along a circle
and identifying points have been formalized by mathematicians along the
way and it is more convenient to use the language of category theory at
this stage. Gluing can best be described by the operation of taking the
push-out of two maps. Let A be a subspace of X, which we represent by a
monomorphism i : A X and f : A→ Y be an arbitrary continuous map.
Gluing X to Y along the image of A in Y amounts to constructing X f Y
in the following push-out:
Definition 5.2. — A CW-complex is a space X together with a ﬁltra-
tion of subspaces
X−1 ⊆ X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Xn ⊆ . . . ⊆ X
such that
1. the n-skeleton Xn is constructed from Xn−1 by attaching n-cells enα
with the maps φα : Sn−1 → Xn−1;
2. X =
⋃
n1 X
n;
3. A subset A ⊆ X is closed if and only if A ∩Xn is closed in Xn for
all n  0. This says that the space X carries the weak topology with
respect to the spaces {Xn}n0.
Almost all interesting geometric spaces are CW-complexes. We have al-
ready mentioned that all n-spheres can be trivially decomposed into CW-
complexes. A 1-dimensional CW-complex is a graph (seen as a topological
space). The real projective n-space RPn, the complex projective n-space
CPn can all be constructed as CW-complexes.
CW-complexes are “nice” spaces. They are necessarily Hausdorﬀ, locally
contractible and every compact manifold is homotopy equivalent to a CW-
complex. (See [41, pp. 519 - 529] or [78, pp. 199-200] for proofs.)
Our claim, not surprisingly, is that CW-complex are object models of
(nice) spaces: they clearly satisfy the four conditions listed at the end of
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section 2. CW-complex constitute a clear example of models of topological
spaces designed speciﬁcally for the purposes of homotopy theory. Indeed,
one and the same space X can be decomposed in diﬀerent CW-complexes
and some decompositions are chosen because they simplify computations.
Furthermore, one can use the building pattern of CW-complexes to develop
arguments that proceed combinatorially cell-by-cell. Various constructions
can be performed on CW-complexes, that is products, quotients, suspension,
wedge and smash products, allowing one to build more intricate complexes
to model various spaces naturally. In fact, these constructions are better
seen as being performed in the category of CW-complexes with continuous
mappings between them.
In fact, CW-complexes come very close to solve the principal problem
of topology. In order to see this, we need to recall a diﬀerent version of
homotopy equivalence, namely the so-called weak homotopy equivalence16.
Definition 5.3. — A map f : X → Y is a weak homotopy equivalence
if for each base point x ∈ X, the induced map f∗ : πn(X,x) → πn(Y, f(y))
is a bijection of sets for n = 0 and an isomorphism of groups for n  117.
Two spaces, X and Y are said to be weakly homotopy equivalent if there
is a weak homotopy equivalence between them. The latter deﬁnition is de-
ceptive. The terminology suggests that it is also an equivalence relation. The
main problem here is that the continuous map f : X → Y has to be given
to start with and although it can easily be veriﬁed that the deﬁnition is
reﬂexive and transitive, it need not be symmetric. Indeed, there is no guar-
antee that the map f has an inverse. The diﬀerence between being weakly
homotopy equivalent and being homotopy equivalent can be illustrated by
the following analogy. In the case of two spaces being homotopy equivalent,
we have rules that allow us to continuously transform the spaces into each
other (and we are allowed to identify points on the way). Being weakly ho-
motopy equivalent means that we have a way of mapping one space into the
other and that as far as our indicators can tell, that is the homotopy groups,
the spaces are essentially indistinguishable. Notice also that the underlying
sets of two weakly homotopy equivalent spaces have the same cardinality.
CW-complexes were designed for homotopy theory precisely because the
relations of being homotopy equivalent and being weakly homotopy equiv-
alent coincide in the following precise sense:
(16) At this stage, I have to assume that the reader is familiar with homotopy groups.
See [41, chapter 4] or [78, chapter 11]
(17) It is of course possible to give examples of weak homotopy equivalences between
spaces that are not homotopy equivalent. See [41, chapter 4].
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Theorem 5.4 (Whitehead [41, chapter 4]). — If X and Y are connected
CW-complexes and if f : X → Y is a continuous map such that f∗ :
πn(X,x0) → πn(Y, y0) is an isomorphism for all n, then f is a homotopy
equivalence.
Thus, whenever two connected CW-complexes X and Y are weakly homo-
topy equivalent, they are homotopy equivalent, that isX and Y are tokens of
the same homotopy type18. Thus, in the case of connected CW-complexes,
the required information is included in the maps that induce the isomor-
phisms of groups. In this sense, the homotopy groups and the maps inducing
the isomorphisms give us all the invariants we need. From that perspective,
CW-complexes are very nice models of topological spaces indeed.
But they are not quite what we dreamed of. At this point, two options
are open: simplify the data in one way or another or try a more abstract
approach. In fact, it is when these two approaches are combined together
that one obtains a very powerful machinery.
6. Algebraic models of homotopy types of spaces
Let us turn to homotopy n-types, introduced by R.H. Fox in 1941. In-
formally and very roughly, a homotopy n-type is a type of spaces that are
homotopy equivalent in dimension n. For us, the interesting aspect of ho-
motopy n-types is that they constitute ‘toy’ models, in the sense that one
controls systematically the complexity involved right from the start. Thus,
once one has the general notion of homotopy types and then the notion of
weak homotopy types, it is a simpliﬁcation to move to homotopy n-types
and try to understand them. The hope would then be to have a better
picture of the general notion from this more simple situation.
A homotopy n-type is a homotopy type such that all its homotopy groups
higher than n are trivial, i.e. for all j > n, πj = 0. Usually, tokens of
homotopy n-types are taken to be CW-complex (this is how we know that
these spaces exist). Thus, a homotopy 1-type is exhibited by a CW-complex
such that for all j > 1, πj = 0.
Let us start with homotopy 0-types. The latter is exhibited by any space
whose homotopy groups πj are all trivial for j > 0. In particular, π1 is
(18) In fact, a CW-complex is always homotopy equivalent to a polyhedron and is, in
that sense, a “nice” space. One has to be careful here: as Hatcher rightly emphasizes,
Whitehead’s theorem does not say that two CW complexes with isomorphic homotopy
groups are homotopy equivalent. It says that if there is a map that induces isomorphisms
between homotopy groups, then that map is a homotopy equivalence. Hatcher [41, p.
348] gives examples of spaces that have isomorphic homotopy groups but that are not
homotopy equivalent.
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trivial, thus any homotopy 0-type is contractible. One can in fact think of
the path-components given by π0 as being contractible also, and thus as
being homotopically equivalent to geometric points. These are the simplest
and they are modeled by sets. In other words, a set is a codiﬁed model of a
discrete homotopy 0-type. In this framework, one can think of sets as made
up of geometric points, the later being a contractible space (and presumably
one has in mind its contracted image) and thus, all the elements of these
sets are urelements and not sets themselves.
Consider now homotopy 1-types. For simplicity, we could ﬁrst consider
connected homotopy 1-types. Using some basic algebraic topology, one can
show that they correspond to groups! Indeed, let G be a group. One con-
structs the Eilenberg-Mac Lane space K(G, 1)19. It is by construction a
path-connected space and it can be shown that the homotopy type of (a
CW-complex) K(G, 1) is uniquely determined by G20. In other words, there
is a functor
B : Grp → CWcomp
that associates to a group G its classifying space BG, which in this case
is the space K(G, 1), such that π1(BG) ∼= G and πi(BG) = 0 for i > 1.
This statements says precisely how groups constitute models of connected
homotopy 1-types.
Some important remarks have to be made at this point. Of course, in
contrast with CW-complexes, groups were not invented for the purpose of
homotopy theory. Furthermore, groups are connected to CW-complexes,
which are themselves models of topological spaces. Finally, groups are of an
entirely diﬀerent nature from spaces and this is a crucial element. Whereas a
CW-complex is a (constructed) space, a group is not a space21. A group is a
model of a very diﬀerent kind indeed, but it is a model nonetheless. Although
a given group G itself is not constructed (but it might be), there is a deﬁnite
construction from G to its corresponding CW-complex which is necessary
to see that it stands for a space in a certain manner. The important fact is
that G contains the information that leads to the construction of the space
BG. In our terminology, groups constitute codiﬁed models of spaces as all
the following extensions in this section.
If we remove the restriction and consider arbitrary homotopy 1-types,
then it can be shown that they correspond to groupoids. Recall that a
(19) In fact, there are many diﬀerent possible constructions. See, for instance, [41, sec-
tions 1.B and 4.2].
(20) “Having a unique homotopy type of K(G, 1)’s associated to each group G means
that algebraic invariants of spaces that depend only on homotopy type, such as homology
and cohomology groups, become invariants of groups.”[41, p. 90].
(21) Of course, theyre are topological groups, but we are talking of groups here.
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groupoid is a category in which every morphism is invertible, i.e. in which
every morphism is an isomorphism.
Definition 6.1. — A groupoid is a category in which every morphism
is an isomorphism, that is for every f : X → Y , there is an f−1 : Y → X
such that f ◦ f−1 = idY and f−1 ◦ f = idX .
Thus any group G is a groupoid, since it can be seen as a one object
category satisfying the property stipulated in the foregoing deﬁnition. (For
a brief history of the concept of groupoid, see [18].)
Now, let X be a topological space. It is possible to deﬁne a category,
denoted by Π1(X), directly from the homotopy properties of paths in X.
By doing so, we are here thinking of a space as an algebra of paths. The
objects of Π1(X) are its points x, y, . . . . A morphism x → y of Π1(X) is
a path class from x to y, that is an homotopy class of paths from x to y.
It can be shown that this in indeed a category and in fact a groupoid. It is
called the fundamental groupoid of X. (See [21, section 6.2] for a proof and
some of its properties or [40, chap. 3] for a presentation in the simplicial
context.) Of course, Π1(−) is a functor from a category of topological spaces
to the category of groupoids. It sends a space X to a groupoid Π1(X), a
continuous map of spaces f : X → Y to a functor Π1(f) : Π1(X) → Π1(Y )
and a homotopy class of homotopies to natural transformations. (It is thus
what is called a 2-functor.) This is a very natural construction and the result
seems to unlock a key to the nature of homotopy types. This construction
from topological spaces to groupoids is perhaps closer to what Mumford
had in mind: in some sense, we are abstracting from topological spaces to
construct the corresponding groupoids and the latter reﬂect only speciﬁc
properties of topological spaces. In this sense, they constitute models of
topological spaces. Grothendieck’s conjectured already in the early 1980’s
that the higher-dimensional component inherent to homotopy types can be
captured by an appropriate notion of higher-dimensional groupoid.
Groupoids model arbitrary homotopy 1-types. To see this, one starts
with groupoids and construct a homotopy 1-type from it in such a way
that maps of groupoids, e.g. functors, become continuous maps of spaces
and natural transformations are translated into homotopy classes of ho-
motopies. It is possible to construct, for any groupoid G, its Eilenberg-Mac
Lane space |G| and prove that the latter is a CW-complex and, in fact, a ho-
motopy 1-type, i.e. such that the homotopy type of the constructed space is
uniquely determined by the groupoid G. It is then possible to show that the
(2-)category of homotopy 1-types is equivalent (in a precise mathematical
sense) to the (2-)category of groupoids.
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The algebraic objects corresponding to homotopy 2-types, called crossed-
modules, were introduced already by Whitehead. A crossed-module is a pair
of groups G1, G0 and a right action of G0 on G1 together with a group homo-
morphism φ : G1 → G0 respecting the action. (For the algebraic expression
of these conditions, see [60, p. 285] or [70, pp. 79-81].) In the context of
homotopy theory, G1 is the homotopy group π2 and the group G0 is π1.
Whitehead together with Mac Lane have shown in 1950 that there is func-
tor B from the category of crossed modules to the category of CW-spaces
showing how crossed-modules can be taken as algebraic models of homotopy
2-types. (Beware that what Mac Lane and Whitehead call a 3-type is now
called a 2-type. See [61], [23], [20].)
We have moved from groups, to groupoids and to crossed-modules. It is
impossible not to look for some kind of uniformity on the algebraic side that
corresponds to the uniformity on the topological side. Is there such a thing as
a 2-groupoid such that there would be a correspondence between these and
homotopy 2-types? Recall that a groupoid can be deﬁned as being a category
in which all morphisms are isomorphisms or invertible. Can we deﬁne a 2-
groupoid as a 2-category in which all morphisms are isomorphisms? It is
indeed possible. First, there is a deﬁnition of a 2-category.
In the technical jargon, a 2-category is a category enriched over Cat,
that category of (small) categories.
More speciﬁcally, a 2-category is given by the following data:
1. A set of objects a, b, c, ...;
2. A function which assigns to each ordered pair of objects (a, b) a cat-
egory T (a, b);
3. For each ordered triple < a, b, c > of objects a functor
Ka,b,c : T (b, c)× T (a, b) → T (a, c)
called composition;
4. For each object a, a functor Ua : 1 → T (a, a);
such that the composition satisfy the obvious associative law and Ua is a
left and right identity for this composition.
The distinctive feature of 2-categories is that they have two composition
operations, a “vertical” composition that is part of the vertical categories
T (−,−) and an “horizontal” composition given by the functor K(−,−,−) and
these two operations agree with each other. There is a algebraic presentation
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of 2-categories which makes these compositions and their relationships more
explicit. (See [60, chap. XII] for a detailed presentation and other relevant
notions.) A strict 2-groupoid is then deﬁned to be a 2-category in which all
1-cells and 2-cells are isomorphisms.
Can we simply go on? Can we deﬁne 3-groupoids as 3-categories in which
all morphisms are isomorphisms? It is precisely when we get to this step
that the situation becomes surprising. It is of course possible to deﬁne a
3-category and then derive from the latter deﬁnition the notion of a 3-
groupoid. However, the latter notion does not capture homotopy 3-types.
As usual, moving up a dimension yields considerable more leeway.
Before we look at homotopy 3-types and their algebraic models in more
details, it is probably a good idea to stop and discuss a few surprising
results relating groups, categories and crossed-modules. Suppose we work
in a category of sets S. In fact, all we need is a category with suﬃciently
good properties, e.g. ﬁnite limits22. We now deﬁne an internal category in
S: it consists of two objects C0 and C1 together with four morphisms in S:
where the morphism c is deﬁned on the following pullback:
Informally, C0 is the object or set of objects, C1 is the set of morphisms,
the morphism i sends to each object of C0, its identity morphism, d0 sends
a morphism to its domain, d1 sends a morphism to its codomain and c is
the composition of morphisms.
These maps are naturally constrained to satisfy four commutativity con-
ditions, each of which corresponding to an axiom of category theory. (See
[60, p. 268].) If we are working in a category S of sets, then this yields
a small category. But it can also be done in any category with the right
(22) This is typical of one of the ways one can work with categories as a foundational
framework: simply stipulate the properties and the structure needed for the speciﬁc piece
of mathematics to be developed. As far as practicing mathematicians are concerned,
this is perfectly ﬁne. Things become more murky when we are dealing with categories
themselves...
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properties. Thus, we can consider a internal category in the category Grp
of groups and group homomorphisms and it can be veriﬁed that in this case
that an internal category in Grp is the same as an internal group in the
category Cat of small categories. (See [60, p. 269].)
It is certainly a surprising fact that the category of internal categories in
Grp is equivalent, that is essentially the same, as the category of crossed-
modules. (See [60, pp. 285-287] for a proof. Even Mac Lane, who introduced
categories and worked with crossed-modules with Whitehead qualiﬁed this
result as “striking”!) In fact, it is possible to be even more precise, as follows.
In the same way that we have deﬁned an internal category in a category S,
it is possible to deﬁne an internal group G in a category S. In particular,
it is possible to deﬁne a group object in the category Grpoid of groupoids.
This is what is called a 2-group G. Again, this is in fact just a special case
of the above, a 2-group can also be deﬁned as a groupoid in the category
Grp of groups. Finally, a 2-group can also be desbribed as a 2-category
with one object in which all 1-morphisms and 2-morphisms are invertible.
What we see here is that already at the level of homotopy 2-types, there
are many diﬀerent ways to generalize the notion of crossed-modules and each
of these provides algebraic models of 2-types. It turns out that these notions
can be generalized to n-types and that they indeed model all homotopy n-
types. (See [71], [72].)
However, homotopy 2-types can be modeled by strict 2-groupoids, but
this fails when we move to 3-types. It is the strictness condition that fails
when we move to (connected) 3-types: there are homotopy 3-types that
cannot be modeled by strict 3-groupoids. More precisely, it can be shown
that there is no strict 3-groupoid G such that its geometric realization is
weakly equivalent to the 3-type of the sphere S2! (See [23, 24, 19, 20], [10],
[81, chap. 4].) A simply connected 3-type is modeled by a braided categorical
group. (See [49] for details.)
Thus, when we move to homotopy n-types, for n > 2, we are forced to
consider what are called weak n-categories, in particular weak n-groupoids.
In fact, it is taken as a desiderata that any formalization of the latter notion
should automatically model homotopy types as a special case23.
Let us pause and come back to models. We have shown that CW-
complexes can be thought of as object models of topological spaces. We have
now looked at codiﬁed models of homotopy types. The picture is somewhat
more complicated and, in fact, more interesting. Whereas object models of
(23) Here are some references on the topic: [3], [12], [22], [27], [47], [54], [82], [89, 90].
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topological spaces were introduced to provide a handle on the classiﬁcation
problem, codiﬁed models of homotopy types are introduced not only because
the classiﬁcation problem is just as hard, but also because homotopy types
are inherently more abstract than topological spaces. An algebraic gadget
is a model of a homotopy type when it is possible to systematically con-
struct, from the algebraic gadget, a space such that its homotopy invariants
are included, in some appropriate sense, in the algebraic gadget one started
with. In this sense, the models capture all the essential information of the
spaces. The algebraic models are clearly diﬀerent from the topological mod-
els that were introduced. Notice that the two types of models are related:
from the codiﬁed algebraic model, one constructs a topological model, e.g.
a CW complex, and then establishes that the ﬁrst is, in this speciﬁc sense,
a model of the homotopy type of a space. The shift illustrates one of our
points: the fact that mathematicians are building various kinds of models of
spaces. The variety is important, for it provides a way to test how stable a
certain notion is. The convergence is another important question: when one
is able to show that apparently diﬀerent models are equivalent, in an ade-
quate sense of equivalence, then one has another indication that the various
models capture important ingredients of the systems studied.
Category theory provides something more: the search for the “best”
possible model, that is, a universal model. But for this to be possible, one
has to climb the ladder of abstraction.
7. The abstract framework: categorical contexts
Once categories had been introduced by Eilenberg & Mac Lane in the
early 1940’s, Eilenberg & Steenrod quickly realized that they could use
the language of categories, functors and natural transformations to provide
a clear and systematic foundations for algebraic topology24. The object of
study is the category Top of topological spaces and continuous mappings25.
Eilenberg & Steenrod suggested that the algebraic invariants associated
to topological spaces and continuous maps should be functors from the
category Top to various categories of algebraic structures, like the category
Grp of groups and group homomorphisms. Thus, in their book, Eilenberg
& Steenrod gives axiom of homology theories and these axioms stipulates
that a homology theory is a functor from a category of topological spaces to
an algebraic category, e.g. groups, abelian groups, modules, vector spaces,
(24) See [58] and [64] for more on these aspects of the history of category theory.
(25) From the point of view of what used to be called “combinatorial topology”, it took
quite some time to show that combinatorial methods could be applied to an arbitrary
topological space. One has to keep in mind that in algebraic topology, one studies spaces
that are usually geometrically motivated and ignores more pathological cases that follow
under the axiomatic characterization of the concept.
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rings, etc. One of the points of Eilenberg & Steenrod’s book is to set up the
theory so that one can compare various homology theories systematically,
which means via natural transformations between functors.
Both Eilenberg & Mac Lane ([33]) as well as Eilenberg & Steenrod ([34])
made suggestions as to how to formulate the basic ingredients of homotopy
theory into the language of category theory. Again, the idea is that the
links between the topological data and the algebraic data should be functo-
rial. Mathematicians ﬁrst tried to modify the axioms given by Eilenberg &
Steenrod for homology (and cohomology) groups to characterize homotopy
groups. Thus, in the case of homotopy theory, we have a series of functors:
1. π0 : Top → Set
2. π1 : Top → Grp
3. π2 : Top → AbGrp
...
n. πn : Top → AbGrp
...
The ﬁrst functor yields, to each topological space X, the set of connected
components π0(X). The second functor is the fundamental group π1 of a
space X, a construction introduced by Poincare´ in 1895, although, of course,
not as a functor. The other πi’s were all introduced at once by Hurewicz
and they are known as the higher homotopy groups.
Most topological invariants are deﬁned up to homotopy. For instance, ho-
mology theories and cohomology theories are functors from a category Top
of topological spaces and an algebraic category, e.g. the category AbGrp of
abelian groups. But these functors are all homotopy invariant: they preserve
homotopy equivalences which are not the equivalences of Top26. (See, for
precise statements and proofs, [41, pages 110-111 and page 201].)
This is where the systemic models come in. The natural thing to do is to
construct a quotient category of Top, denoted by ho(Top), as follows: the
objects of ho(Top) are the objects of Top but a morphism in ho(Top) is
a homotopy class [f ] of maps. Thus the family of morphisms between two
spaces X and Y is [X,Y ]. Homology and cohomology theories, as well as the
(26) The specialist will have noticed that we restrict our presentation to the category
Top of topological spaces, whereas one often considers the category Top∗ of pointed
spaces. Although this is technically important, it does not aﬀect our discussion in any
relevant manner.
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homotopy groups, are best described as being functors H : ho(Top) → C,
for some algebraic category C. This appears to be innocuous and concep-
tually sound.
Indeed, in ho(Top) an isomorphism is an homotopy equivalence. Thus,
whereas in the category Top, isomorphisms are homeomorphisms, in the
category ho(Top), isomorphisms are homotopy equivalences. By moving
to equivalence classes of morphisms between spaces, we have restored the
equality sign between certain morphisms: instead of having f ◦ g ∼ idY and
g ◦ f ∼ idX , we have [f ◦ g] = [ idY ] and [g ◦ f ] = [ idX ]. Surprisingly,
perhaps, the passage from the category Top to the category ho(Top) does
not modify the objects of the category, but the criterion of identity for its
morphisms.
However, once more, things are not so simple. As Peter Freyd has re-
marked already in the late sixties, the category ho(Top) “has always been
the best example of an abstract category, historically and philosophically.”
([37, page 1]) What Freyd means by this is the fact, proved by him, that
there cannot be a faithful embedding F : ho(Top) → Set. (Recall that a
functor F : C → D is faithful when for every pair of parallel morphisms
f, f ′ : X → Y in C, if F (f) = F (f ′) : F (X) → F (Y ) in D, then f = f ′
was already the case in C. I urge the reader to look at Freyd’s proof, for it
is quite interesting in itself.) This has to be compared with more familiar
cases. For instance, there are faithful embeddings F : Grp → Set — the
forgetful functor will do. Thus, in this sense, the category Grp of groups is
concrete. And so are most of the categories of structures one usually think
of. In Freyd’s terminology, the homotopy category ho(Top) is abstract.
One interpretation of Freyd’s result is that, from a functorial point of view,
there is no way to interpret the morphisms of ho(Top) as set-theoretical
functions. It is in this precise sense that the category ho(Top) is abstract
— a concrete category C being a category for which the morphisms of C
can be thought of as genuine functions between the objects of C27. I, for
one, interpret this results as revealing the presence of a conceptual fault
between the universe of homotopy types and the universe of (extensional)
sets. But the conceptual quake set oﬀ by Freyd’s result has not attracted
the attention of philosophers of mathematics.
(27) Of course, Freyd’s result does not contradict the fact that any category C can be
embedded faithfully in the functor category SetC
op
by the so-called Yoneda embedding.
For one thing, the latter category is considerably bigger than the category Set.
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8. Deﬁning abstract homotopy types
The fundamental theorems of this paper are theorems 3.1 and
3.2. [...] These theorems (3.1 and 3.2) are of considerable inter-
est in themselves. They exhibit a duality which is quite strik-
ing and seem to indicate a relatively unexplored region which
I might designate as “algebra of mapping classes”. In this con-
nection they should be compared with the fundamental theo-
rem of ﬁbre spaces to which they bear an evident analogy. ([35,
p. 40])
8.1. Abstract categorical contexts
The homotopy category is the abstract embodiment of the universe of
homotopy types, if only because the isomorphisms are homotopy equiva-
lences. But as a matter of fact, when one does homotopy theory, one seldom
works only in ho(Top). Rather, one works in models of homotopy theory
or, to use a slightly diﬀerent terminology, speciﬁc instances of such a theory
and uses functors between these categories and homotopy categories. Mathe-
maticians do not work directly with homotopy types, but always with tokens
of those types. This applies to categories as well and, thus, one works with
model categories28. The latter provide the abstract setting in which one can
deﬁne and do homotopy theory and one and the same category can provide
diﬀerent model categories. They are thus the universes of homotopy types.
One does not try to deﬁne homotopy types as sets with a structure and
then deﬁne a category with these objects and the appropriate morphisms
between them, rather one tries to deﬁne directly a category of such entities
and fully use categorical properties and constructions to understand them.
Casting homotopical ideas in the language of category theory leads to
an abstract understanding of homotopy theory: its basic concepts and con-
structions turn out to be expressible in terms of the structure and properties
of a category, in other words in terms of arrows only. However, as is very
often the case, translating these concepts in categorical language introduces
subtle diﬀerences and opens up vast possibilities29. We will provide the de-
tails of the lifting process in an appendix and move directly to the issues
that are relevant to our enterprise.
(28) The notion of model category is a technical notion and although the term ‘model’
is used here, it is clearly not used in the way we are using the term ‘model’ in this paper.
(29) As is very often the case, translating concepts into the categorical language is at
the same time a generalization and an abstraction. This, in turn, yields new methods of
deﬁnition and proof which are then transferable to other contexts.
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In the nineteen ﬁfties and sixties, these notions were lifted — no pun
intended — from the topological context to various algebraic contexts. Then
Dan Quillen introduced axioms for a purely abstract homotopy theory that
allowed him to prove important theorems in rational homotopy theory.30
(See [75], [76].) These axioms deﬁne what is now called a model category.
It is then possible to construct a homotopy theory for that model category.
It turns out that the important notions for these constructions are weak
equivalences, ﬁbrations and coﬁbrations.31 I will here follow Dwyer and
Spalinsky [32] and Hovey [44].
Definition 8.1. — A model category is a category C with three distin-
guished classes of maps:
1. weak equivalences,
2. ﬁbrations,
3. coﬁbrations,
each of which is closed under composition and contains all identity maps
and satisfying the following axioms:
MC1 C has all ﬁnite limits and colimits.32
MC2 If f and g are maps in C such that g ◦ f is deﬁned and if two of the
three maps f, g, g ◦ f are weak equivalences, then so is the third. (The
so-called 2-out-of-3 property.)
(30) I have to underline the fact that Quillen’s development of an abstract homotopy
theory was not the ﬁrst nor is it the last. In a sense, it goes back to the beginning of
algebraic topology itself with the notion of simplicial complexes. But as far as I can tell,
J. H. C. Whitehead was the ﬁrst to call explicitly for an algebraic analysis of homotopy
theory in the 1940’s. Whitehead’s approach was based on a combinatorial framework with
adequate categorical properties, namely CW-complexes, a notion that he introduced. See
[93], [94]. In 1955, Daniel Kan entitled a series of four papers “Abstract Homotopy” in
which he deﬁned a homotopy in any category with certain objects satisfying very weak
properties. (See [50], [51], [52], [53].) In particular, he showed how to deﬁne homotopy
groups in the category of simplicial sets and showed that they corresponded to the tra-
ditional homotopy groups of spaces under precise correspondences. However, he did not
deﬁne a type of category appropriate for homotopy theory. This step was more or less ini-
tiated by Quillen, inspired by Grothendieck’s approach to homological algebra via abelian
categories. In fact, Quillen saw homotopical algebra as a generalization of homological
algebra, since a speciﬁc model category on a category of algebraic structures is identical
with what is usually considered to be homological algebra. But there were and still are
other approaches, basically depending on one’s needs. See [4], [6], [16], [17], [42], [73], [80].
Hence what constitutes an adequate abstract homotopy theory is still being discussed.
See [74]. There are still fundamental developments going on in the ﬁeld revealing pivotal
conceptual elements of the theory. See [31].
(31) To be more precise, it seems that weak equivalences are conceptually the basic
elements and that ﬁbrations and coﬁbrations are required to develop the homotopical
machinery. See [31].
(32) In some deﬁnitions, this condition is relaxed to small limits and colimits.
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MC3 If f is a retract of g and g is a ﬁbration, coﬁbration, or a weak
equivalence, then so is f .
MC4 A map f that is both a coﬁbration and a weak equivalence is called
a trivial coﬁbration and a map f is a trivial ﬁbration if it is both a
ﬁbration and a weak equivalence.33 Given a commutative diagram
a lift exists in the diagram in either of the following situations: (i) i is
a coﬁbration and p is a trivial ﬁbration, or (ii) i is a trivial coﬁbration
and p is a ﬁbration;
MC5 Any map f can be factored in two ways: (i) f = p ◦ i, where i is a
coﬁbration and p is a trivial ﬁbration, and (ii) f = p ◦ i, where i is a
trivial coﬁbration and p is a ﬁbration.
The investigations of the logical consequences of these axioms is what
Quillen called homotopical algebra. It is the theory of the properties of any
model category, thus a speciﬁc case of general abstract nonsense. To obtain
speciﬁc results about particular cases, one has to specify a category with a
chosen model structure. Here are some examples of model categories.
The ﬁrst example is totally trivial. Let C be any category with ﬁnite
limits and colimits. Then by stipulating that a morphism is a weak equiv-
alence if and only if it is an isomorphism and that every morphism is both
a coﬁbration and a ﬁbration, one obtains a model category. That such a
category satisﬁes the properties of a model category is immediately veriﬁed.
More interesting examples are oﬀered by the category of topological
spaces and the category of pointed topological spaces. In Top, one can
take as weak equivalences the standard homotopy equivalences, as ﬁbrations
Hurewicz ﬁbrations and as coﬁbrations closed coﬁbrations. As was shown
ﬁrst by Stro˝m, this yields a model category. (See [83].)
A diﬀerent and more useful model structure on the same category is
provided by the following choices: weak equivalences are the usual weak ho-
motopy equivalences, ﬁbrations are the so-called Serre ﬁbrations and coﬁ-
brations are retracts of speciﬁed maps. (See [32, section 8] or [44, section
(33) Some authors call a trivial ﬁbration an acyclic ﬁbration (respectively a trivial
coﬁbration an acyclic coﬁbration).
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2.4] for deﬁnitions and details.) These two examples illustrate how one and
the same category can bear diﬀerent model categories.
Quillen’s axiomatization of a model category completely changed the
face of homotopy theory. Model categories revealed new classical homotopy
theories and opened the door to completely new and unforseeable homotopy
theories.
It’s hard to tell from this vantage point whether or not it was
one of the original goals of the theory, but it’s major feature
of homotopical algebra [sic] that the notion of homotopy itself
“explodes” in this context. ([46, p. 653])
Furthermore, homotopy theory became independent of the original topo-
logical context.
As such, the methods and ideas are algebraic and combinato-
rial and, despite the deep connection with the homotopy theory
of topological spaces, exist completely outside any topological
context. This point of view was eﬀectively introduced by Kan,
and later encoded by Quillen in the notion of a closed model
category. Simplicial homotopy theory, and more generally the
homotopy theories associated to closed model categories, can
then be interpreted as a purely algebraic enterprise, .... The
point is that homotopy is more than the standard variational
principle from topology and analysis: homotopy theories are
everywhere, along with functorial methods of relating them.
[40, p. i]
Quillen’s objective was to use homotopical methods in order to solve al-
gebraic problems. This was made possible once he was able to show that the
categories of algebraic structures he was interested in, namely the category
of diﬀerential graded Lie algebras, could be turned into model categories.
(See [76].) Quillen showed that there were many others: the category of
simplical sets, the category of simplicial groups, or more generally cate-
gories of simplicial objects, the latter family covering a wide range of cases.
Nowadays, these methods extend to other ﬁelds, most notably in algebraic
geometry with the ground breaking work of Voevodsky. His proof of the
Milnor conjecture rests on the transfer of homotopical methods to algebraic
geometry and model categories play a pivotal role in this transfer. (See [91],
[66].)
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8.2. Homotopy categories
Model categories provide the materials to build a homotopy theory. Ob-
serve that any model category C, since it has ﬁnite limits and colimits, has
an initial object, denoted as usual by 0 and a terminal object, denoted by
1. This allows us to deﬁne two classes of important objects in any model
category.
Definition 8.2. — Let C be a model category. An object X of C is said
to be coﬁbrant if the morphism 0 → X is a coﬁbration and an object Y is
said to be ﬁbrant if the morphism Y → 1 is a ﬁbration.
Given these deﬁnitions, it is possible to restate Whitehead’s theorem in
the language of model categories: any weak equivalence f : X → Y is a
homotopy equivalence if X and Y are both ﬁbrant and coﬁbrant. One can
then show that CW-complexes are ﬁbrant and coﬁbrant.
It is easy to convince oneself that in any model category C it is possible,
for any given objectsX and Y of C, to construct directly from the data of the
model structure a cylinder on X and a path space on Y and, therefore, the
notion of a left homotopy and the notion of a right homotopy. Furthermore,
it can be shown that if X is a coﬁbrant object of C and Y is a ﬁbrant
object of C and f, g : X → Y are morphisms of C, then the left homotopy
and the right homotopy relations coincide and are equivalence relations on
HomC(X,Y ). (See, for instance, [32, section 4] or [44, 9 – 11].) Thus, to
make sure that left homotopies coincide with right homotopies, one takes
the full subcategory Ccf of C with objects the coﬁbrant and ﬁbrant objects
of C. We therefore have a purely abstract notion of homotopy types at our
disposal, completely independent of the topological setting we started with.
Although this gives us a completely reasonable deﬁnition of homotopy,
we still do not have a homotopy theory yet: although homotopies between
morphisms in Ccf are deﬁnable, homotopy equivalences are not necessarily
invertible, as was the case with weak equivalences of CW-complexes. The
strategy at that stage is the same as in the case of the category Top of
topological spaces: move to the quotient category Ccf/ ∼. And as in the case
of Top, a lot of information is lost about the model structure, particularly
the higher dimensional information, but the hope is that the homotopically
relevant information is kept and is easily manageable. This is as always
when one tries to translate a given structure into a diﬀerent structure in
the hope of capturing the essential ingredients of a situation. This is one
of the reasons why there are various notions of model structures in the
literature: it is a question of ﬁne tuning between what is lost and what is
gained by the same token.
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This is one construction of the homotopy category of the model cate-
gory C. There is a diﬀerent construction yielding a diﬀerent category, de-
noted by Ho(C), which is categorically equivalent — not isomorphic! —
to the category Ccf/ ∼. Furthermore, there are naturally deﬁned functors
C → Ccf/ ∼ and γ : C → Ho(C). In both cases, the weak equivalences
of the model category C become homotopy equivalences. More precisely, a
morphism f : X → Y of the model category C is a weak equivalence if and
only its image γ(f) is an isomorphism in Ho(C). We are now fully in the
framework of systemic models.
Furthermore, Quillen has given a deﬁnition of an equivalence between
homotopy categories, thus providing a way to determine when two homotopy
categories or theories are essentially the same. (See [75] or [44, section 1.3].)
Here is an interesting and important example of two seemingly diﬀerent
categories that yield Quillen equivalent homotopy categories. First, we need
to introduce yet two more important categories, the simplicial category and
the category of simplicial sets.
Let ∆ be the category whose objects are the sets [n] = {0, 1, ..., n}, for
n  0 a nonnegative integer with the natural order and with morphisms the
order preserving maps between these sets, that is functions f : [n] → [m]
such that if i  j then f(i)  f(j). This is the simplicial category34.
The simplicial category has a geometric interpretation which plays a
vital part in our story. In the euclidean space Rn+1 the standard geometric
n-simplex ∆n is the convex closure of the standard basis e0 = (1, ..., 0), . . . ,
en = (0, ..., 1), that is the subspace of Rn+1 deﬁned by
∆n = {p =
n∑
i=0
tiei|t0  0, ..., tn  0,
n∑
i=0
ti = 1}.
In the standard basis, ∆0 is simply the point 1, ∆1 is “the” unit interval
[0, 1], ∆2 is a triangle with the standard unit points as vertices, ∆3 is a
tetrahedron, etc. In general, ∆0 is a point, ∆1 is an interval or an edge, ∆2
is a triangle or a face, etc. By convention, we can stipulate that ∆−1 is the
empty set. One can see that the standard geometric n-simplex has n + 1
faces. These can be seen as images of the following injective maps, called
(34) As emphasized by Mac Lane in [60], the simplicial category has a protean character.
It is the category of ﬁnite ordinal numbers and, as such, a full category of the category
Ord of all linearly ordered sets. It is also a full subcategory of Cat, the category of small
categories. It is the strict monoidal category containing the universal monoid. Finally, it
is a subcategory of Top. When one adds categories of simplicial objects, that is functor
categories from the simplicial category into a category C, then its roles in mathematics
in general become daunting.
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the face maps, δi : ∆n−1 → ∆n,
δi(x0, ..., xn−1) = (x0, ..., xi−1, 0, xi, ..., xn−1), for i = 0, ..., n.
It is also possible to smash an n+ 1-simplex onto an n-simplex. By looking
at speciﬁc cases, it is easy to see that it is precisely what the surjective maps
σi : ∆n+1 → ∆n do:
σi(x0, ..., xn+1) = (x0, ..., xi + xi+1, ..., xn+1), for i = 0, ..., n.
These maps are called the degeneracy maps. The δi’s and the σi’s satisfy
various relations that determine completely the maps between the standard
geometric n-simplices.35 Needless to say, the standard geometric n-simplices
are object models of topological spaces.
The trick is now to identify the elements of an object [n] of ∆ with the
vertices e0, . . . , en of ∆n. We thus get a map from the objects of ∆ to the
standard geometric n-simplexes, which are objects of Top. By assigning to
maps [n] → [m] between objects of ∆, continuous functions ∆n → ∆m, we
obtain a functor ∆ → Top. Thus the combinatorial data [n] and their maps
are embodied in geometrical objects ∆n and geometrical transformations.
The category sSet of simplicial sets is the category whose objects are
contravariant functors X : ∆op → Set and whose morphisms are natural
transformations between them. Notice immediately that there is no topo-
logical structure involved. Thus, simplicial sets are purely combinatorial (in
contrast with CW-complexes which, although they were tailored for homo-
topy theory, have a topology). If we unpack this deﬁnition, we can see that
a simplicial set X can be thought of as a graded set (Xn)n0 together with
two set of functions di : Xn → Xn−1 for i = 0, . . . , n and sj : Xn → Xn+1
for j = 0, . . . , n satisfying the identities
didj = dj−1di for i < j; (8.1)
sisj = sj+1si for i  j; (8.2)
disj = sj−1di for i < j; (8.3)
disj = idXn for i = j or i = j + 1; (8.4)
disj = sjdi−1 for i > j + 1. (8.5)
The maps di are called face maps and the maps sj are called degeneracy
maps. The elements of X are called simplices of X and the elements of a
single Xn are called n-simplices of X.
(35) It is the σ’s that make the simplicial category so useful in homotopy theory. It is
possible to consider a subcategory of ∆ by restricting the morphisms to strictly order
preserving maps, that is if i < j, then f(i) < f(j). The resulting category, although useful
in algebraic topology, does not play a role in homotopy theory.
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Once again, there is a geometric content underlying the whole construc-
tion. One should informally think of each n-simplex x in Xn as a copy of
the standard geometric n-simplex ∆n. Thus, at each stage n, a simplicial
set X has a set of n-simplices. These simplices are related to one another
by the face and the degeneracy maps.
This geometric content has a formal realization: a simplicial setX admits
a geometric realization |X|, a topological space constructed as follows. For
each element x in Xn, one takes a one n-simplex and these are glued together
according to the rules given by the faces and degeneracies. More speciﬁcally,
the geometric realization is the quotient of the disjoint union of standard
simplices ∆n over an equivalence relation determined by the face and the
degeneracy maps:
|X| =
n⊔
i=1
Xn ×∆n/ ∼ .
It can be shown that the geometric realization of a simplicial set is in fact a
CW-complex. Thus, in this precise sense, a simplicial set can be thought of
as a model of topological spaces. They thus constitute combinatorial models
of spaces.
There is a model structure on the category of sSet. This was proved by
Quillen in 1967 and the veriﬁcation is far from trivial. (For a detailed proof,
see [48].) The weak equivalences are geometric homotopy equivalences, that
is a morphism f : X → Y between simplicial sets such that the induced
continuous map |f | : |X| → |Y | is a homotopy equivalence between the geo-
metric realizations. The coﬁbrations are monomorphisms and the ﬁbrations
are the so-called Kan ﬁbrations. This reinforces the idea that simplicial sets
are models of spaces. For the category of simplicial sets is a model category,
thus a homotopical category. One can therefore construct a systemic model
of the category of simplicial sets.
The punch line is that the homotopy category ho(sSet) of simplicial sets
is Quillen equivalent to the homotopy category ho(Top) of the category
of topological spaces with weak homotopical equivalences as equivalences,
Serre ﬁbrations as ﬁbrations and certain retracts as coﬁbrations. This fol-
lows from the fact that the category ho(Top) is Quillen equivalent to the
homotopy category of CW-complexes and it can be shown that the latter
is Quillen equivalent to ho(sSet). In this precise technical sense, ho(sSet)
is a good combinatorial model of homotopy types: it is essentially the same
as far as the homotopy theory of homotopy types is concerned. (See [40]
for details.) We now see how to construct various systemic models of homo-
topy types: when a homotopy category of a homotopical category is Quillen
equivalent to the homotopy category of CW-complexes. It is important to
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note that, once again, we abstract a certain amount of information when
we move to the homotopy category.
In closing, I have to point to important recent work that extend the
foregoing considerations in conceptually interesting directions36. They rep-
resent a crucial conceptual shift in the way categorical constructions are
extended to homotopy types or, more precisely, model categories. I will not
give any technical details in this section. As we have seen, given a category
C, it is possible to construct diﬀerent model categories from it and, there-
fore, diﬀerent homotopy categories. In a paper published in 2001, Daniel
Dugger showed how to construct a universal model category from a given
C. (See [30, 26, 11].) The notion of universality used here is the one coming
from category theory and it is a precise technical notion. The important
fact is that one can look at this universal model category and consider its
properties. It is, in a precise sense, the best possible model and, as such,
gives us information about what could be considered the “robust” content
of any such model category. Since the latter are likely to occupy an impor-
tant place in the foundations of mathematics (see [2, 92]), its detailed study
might be extremely rewarding from a philosophical point of view. It might
yield models for the whole universe of mathematics, an interesting prospect
if there is one.
9. Conclusion
I hope I have provided enough information to at least bring the reader
to consider seriously that pure mathematician are indeed building models
and that the latter activity is fundamental in certain ﬁelds. I have tried to
indicate how this practice evolved over the last seventy years or so and that
the notion of model itself took diﬀerent form and served diﬀerent purposes.
It is, as always, crucial to keep in mind the epistemological functions of
these constructions: they are, right from the start, introduced as devices that
capture essential properties of given mathematical objects and that provide
deﬁnite epistemological gains over the objects one is trying to understand.
They are not shadows of real objects, they are the keys to our understanding
of fundamental features of basic mathematical ideas.
(36) This is but one direction! There is simply too much for us to cover. The explosion
of material is still going on very strong.
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10. Appendix: Lifting homotopical concepts in a categorical
framework
To raise homotopy theory to the abstract level, we basically have to start
from scratch. We need to consider an equivalent way to deﬁne the relation
of homotopy between morphisms. To ﬁx ideas, we start with the familiar
category of topological spaces and continuous spaces. (I basically follow
Kathryn Hess’s presentation to start with. See [43].) Given a space X, the
cylinder on X is the product space X×I together with the monomorphisms
i0 : X  X × I and i1 : X  X × I deﬁned by i0(x) = (x, 0) and
i1(x) = (x, 1) such that the following diagram commutes:
The map πX : X×I → X is the standard projection, namely πX(x, t) =
x for all t. When X is the standard circle S1, it is clear that we get what is
customarily called a cylinder with height equal to a unit. So, the foregoing
construction is a simple generalization of the standard concept. The under-
lying informal process depicted by this construction is that we have a copy
of X at the bottom of the cylinder, a copy of X at the top of the cylin-
der and a continuous “stretch” between the two. We have basically made
a “morphing” of X with itself. But this is still not the abstract concept of
cylinder. We will get to that shortly.
Not surprisingly, the concept of a cylinder provides an equivalent def-
inition of a homotopy between continuous maps. Two continuous maps
f, g : X → Y are said to be left homotopic if there is a continuous map
H : X × I → Y such that the following diagram commutes:
Here the commutativity of the left triangle expresses the fact that f is
at the “bottom” of the cylinder and the commutativity of the right triangle
means that g is at the top. Since H is a continuous map deﬁned on the
whole cylinder, it transforms f into g in a continuous manner, that is, it is
a homotopy from f to g. In contemporary terminology, H morphs f into g.
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Clearly, the relation of being left homotopic is an equivalence relation
between morphisms. In the categories Top and Top∗, this is merely an
equivalent characterization of the notion of an homotopy of maps.
All the previous constructions took place in the category Top. It is pos-
sible to move to an arbitrary category satisfying certain simple properties,
namely the category C has to have ﬁnite limits and colimits37. From now
on, we will assume that we work in a category having the right properties.
In the latter context, the notion of a cylinder of an object X is not de-
ﬁned by taking the product of X with a unit interval I (together with the
induced morphisms). It is deﬁned from very basic morphisms available in
such a category.
First, given an object X in a category C, a coproduct of X with itself
is deﬁned as an object, denoted by X  X, together with two morphisms
j0 : X → X  X and j1 : X → X  X satisfying the usual universal
property. The latter property together with the given morphism idX : X →
X automatically yield the so-called folding morphism  : XX → X which
arises in the following diagram:
I want to emphasize the fact that the folding morphism comes from the
categorical machinery and nothing else. It is a simple example of general
abstract nonsense at work. There is an obvious representation of the folding
morphism that justiﬁes its name: it is as if one would “fold” the object X
over itself and then project these two copies of X which are right above one
another down on X by the folding morphism.
Given an object X, a cylinder γ(X) on X is given by a factorization of
the folding morphism thus:
(37) Often, this is relaxed to all small limits and colimits. But this is a ﬁne technical
point that we will ignore here.
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where the morphism p : γ(X) → X has to be a weak equivalence (a property
to which we will come back). Deﬁning the morphisms i0 = i ◦ j0 and
i1 = i ◦ j1, we get the abstract notion of a left homotopy H between two
morphisms f : X → Y and g : X → Y in C by stipulating that f is
left homotopic to g if there exists a left homotopy H making the following
diagram commutative:
The dual notion of a right homotopy is given by the concept of a path
space. Classically, a path space on Y , denoted by Y I , is the space {α : I →
Y | α is continuous} with the compact-open topology and the continuous
maps q0 : Y I → Y , q1 : Y I → Y , deﬁned by q0(α) = α(0) and q1(α) = α(1),
such that the following diagram commutes:
where e(y) is the constant path at y. Two continuous maps f, g : X → Y
are said to be right homotopic if there is a continuous map H : X → Y I
such that the following diagram commutes:
As was the case with left homotopies, being right homotopic is also an
equivalence relation.
The construction of a path object P(Y ) on an object Y of a category
C is based on similar basic categorical properties. First, given a product
Y × Y of Y with itself, the diagonal morphism ∆ : Y → Y × Y is deﬁned
canonically by the universal property of products:
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A path object P(Y ) on Y is given by a factorization of the diagonal mor-
phism:
where this time the morphism j is a weak equivalence. Deﬁning the mor-
phisms q0 = p0 ◦ q and q1 = p1 ◦ q, an abstract right homotopy between
two morphisms f : X → Y and g : X → Y is given by a morphism
H : X → P(Y ) such that the diagram
commutes.
It is well-known that for topological spaces satisfying some mild natural
properties, there is a natural bijection between continuous maps of the form
X × I → Y and X → Y I and thus, we can see how the notion of being
right homotopic corresponds naturally to the standard deﬁnition.38 In the
abstract context, one can specify precisely under what conditions left and
right homotopies coincide. We will come back to these conditions in the
next section.
The cylinder object and the path object play a crucial role in the deﬁni-
tion of fundamental concepts of homotopy theory which are also expressible
in terms of diagrams. A continuous map p : E → B is said to satisfy the
homotopy lifting property if whenever there is a commutative square
(38) In fact, in the appropriate conditions, this is a basic example of an adjoint situation.
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then there is a diagonal map Ĥ : X × I → E
such that the two resulting triangles commute. As the name of the property
indicates, the map Ĥ : X × I → E lifts the homotopy H : X × I → B
through p and extends h over i0. A continuous map p : E → B which
satisfy the homotopy lifting property for all such commutative squares is
said to be a Hurewicz ﬁbration.
The dual notion of a coﬁbration is immediate. A subspace i : A  X
satisﬁes the homotopy extension property if whenever there is a commutative
square
there is a diagonal map Ĥ : X → Y I
such that the two resulting triangles commute. Again, as the name indicates,
the map Ĥ : X → Y I extends the homotopy H : A → Y I over i and lifts
h through p0. A continuous map i : A → X which satisﬁes the homotopy
extension property for all such commutative squares is said to be a Hurewicz
coﬁbration.
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Although we have presented them in an abstract setting, the homotopy
lifting property and the homotopy extension property arose from speciﬁc
problems and needs in the homotopy theory of topological spaces. (See [29]
or [63].) They are two technical properties that play a crucial role in many
homotopical contexts involving covering spaces, ﬁber bundles and other im-
portant topological constructions. They are also related to the notion of
homotopy equivalence of spaces, thus to homotopy types. It is certainly
worth sketching the link if only to give an idea of the role played by these
properties.
Let us start with a deﬁnition.
Definition 10.1. — A morphism f : A → X of a category C is a
retract of a morphism g : B → Y if and only if there is commutative
diagram
where the horizontal composites are the identities.
This is not the deﬁnition one ﬁnds in topology textbooks. In the latter,
a retract or a retraction is a map f : X → A having a right inverse, i.e.
there is a map g : A → X such that f ◦ g = idA. It is, however, a special
case of the former deﬁnition. If f : X → A is a retraction, then the following
diagram is a particular case of the deﬁnition:
A X
g
A
idA
X
g
idX
A
f
A
f
idA
Thus, if the spaces are represented by their identity maps, we can say that
the space A is a retract of the space X. In the categorical deﬁnition, the
morphisms are taken as objects.
Retractions underlie a concept closely related to homotopy types. A
continuous map r : X → A is a deformation retraction if it is a retraction
and the composition with the inclusion i : A  X is homotopic to the
identity map idX . Equivalently, a deformation retraction is a homotopy
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H : X×I → X such that ∀x ∈ X and ∀a ∈ A, H(x, 0) = x, H(x, 1) ∈ A and
H(a, 1) = a. In this case, the subspace A is said to be a deformation retract
of X. It is immediate that a deformation retraction is a special case of a
homotopy equivalence. A few examples of deformation retracts immediately
explain the terminology. In ﬁgure 4, the eight ﬁgure is a deformation retract
of the ambient space with two holes and the arrows illustrate the process of
retraction.
Figure 1. — A deformation retraction
Another example of a deformation retraction is provided by the defor-
mation of the Mo˝bius band onto its core circle S1.
Deformation retractions are linked to the homotopy extension property
by two important results. First, if the pair (X,A) satisﬁes the homotopy
extension property and the inclusion i : A X is a homotopy equivalence,
then A is a deformation retract of X. Second, two spaces X and Y are
homotopy equivalent if and only if there is a third space containing both X
and Y as deformation retracts. (See [41, pages 14 – 17] for precise statements
and proofs.)
As we have already indicated, the key properties at work in homotopy
theory are the homotopy lifting property and the homotopy extension prop-
erty. They can be deﬁned for any category C as follows.
Given a commutative square
X Y
g
A
i
B
f
p
a lift or a lifting in the diagram is a morphism h : X → B such that the
resulting diagram
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X Y
g
A
i
B
f
ph
commutes, i.e. h ◦ i = f and p ◦ h = g.
A morphism i : A → X is said to have the left lifting property (LLP)
with respect to another morphism p : B → Y and p is said to have the right
lifting property (RLP) with respect to the morphism i if a lift h : X → B
exists for any commutative square
X Y
g
A
i
B
f
p
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